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This essay revisits an old problem in the law of federal courts: the source
of the right of action in Ex parte Young.'
The core of the story underlying Young is familiar. Shareholders in
railroad corporations filed suit in a federal circuit court, claiming that state-
established rail rates in Minnesota violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
the (dormant) Commerce Clause. The circuit court issued a preliminary
injunction barring adoption of the rates and prohibiting the defendants from
attempting to enforce them. One of the defendants, Minnesota Attorney
General Edward T. Young, nonetheless brought a state court mandamus
action against the Northern Pacific Railway. The circuit court found Young
in contempt and ordered him detained. Young petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his custody was
unjustified because the injunction he had defied was invalid. By his
account, insofar as the plaintiffs had named him as a defendant in their
action challenging the rail rates, their suit was foreclosed by state sovereign
immunity. The Supreme Court held that Young could not set up
Minnesota's immunity, that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the action
challenging the state-prescribed rates, and that the arrangements for
administering the rates did not comport with due process. Justice Peckham
wrote the opinion.
The Young case is primarily remembered for its treatment of sovereign
immunity. Justice Peckham's analysis of that issue has been debated and
alternatively condemned and applauded.2 His explicit holding that the
plaintiffs could proceed on the equity side of the circuit court is also of
enduring significance for cases in which private litigants file federal actions
when no relevant litigation is under way in state court.3 His express
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I would like to thank Brian Balduzzi, Kristin
Collins, Michael G. Collins, Morton Horwitz, William Kaleva, Pnina Lahav, Dan Meltzer,
David Seipp, Avi Soifer, Stefanie Weigmann, and Jeanette Yackle for help with this paper.
1 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2 See Virginia Office for Prot. and Advocacy (VOPA) v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1638-
39 (2011), discussed in the text accompanying notes 99-101, infra.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1974) (citing Young for the
understanding that federal courts generally need not abstain from exercising jurisdiction if
there is no ongoing state proceeding in which a plaintiffs claims can be addressed). In
Young, the ostensible remedy at law was inadequate not only because no state court action
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conclusion that the federal circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction
occasionally draws attention. Peckham rested jurisdiction on the theory
that the suit was one "arising under" federal law inasmuch as the plaintiffs
advanced federal constitutional claims-not because the plaintiffs' right of
action was created by federal law.4 The focus here is on Peckham's
implicit holding that the plaintiffs had a right of action and thus were
entitled to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction.
Nowhere in his opinion did Justice Peckham explain where the plaintiffs
found their right to take their troubles to court. Academics have debated
the possibilities longer than we care to remember. After all this time, the
Supreme Court still has never faced the issue squarely. As recently as the
Douglas case last Term, the problem was presented but was once again left
unresolved.6 There is, however, a way out of these woods-an account that
squares with the actual history of this celebrated case. It is this. The right
of action in Young was an aspect of federal equity jurisprudence and
general law applied in the federal courts at the time, which permitted
shareholders to sue their own companies as well as parties with whom their
was pending when the federal suit was initiated, but also because the risks associated with
challenging the rates by way of defense in state court were formidable. See infra text
accompanying notes 75 & 92. Indeed, it was the difficulty of litigating the validity of the
rates in state court (rather than the rates themselves) that Justice Peckham held to violate due
process. Young, 209 U.S. at 148.
4 In this essay, the term "claim" is not used in the rigorous sense of the allegations of
primary fact setting up a dispute, but in the common sense of the assertions of legal wrong
ascribed to the defendant-here the "claims" that state-prescribed rates violated the
Constitution. Today, of course, federal question jurisdiction generally depends on a
federally created right of action, and cases in which jurisdiction is established on the basis of
the plaintiffs' substantive federal claims alone are exceptions to the general rule. Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006) (explaining that cases
in which jurisdiction exists in the absence of a federal right of action occupy a "slim
category").
5 This essay uses the phrase "right of action" to mean the plaintiffs' entitlement to seek
judicial relief with respect to their claims, avoiding the phrase "cause of action," which is so
often employed to mean the claims for which plaintiffs seek a judicial remedy. The right of
action of interest is the authorization to sue on which the shareholders proceeded in their
original suit-not Attorney General Young's ability to apply for habeas corpus relief.
Original applications for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, more precisely
petitions for leave to apply for an original writ, form a story in themselves. See Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 85-87 (1807) (finessing Article III's narrow limits on
original jurisdiction).
6 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012); see infra text
accompanying note 36 (explaining that the right of action in Young was an important feature
of the arguments in Douglas).
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companies had dealings, seeking injunctive relief protecting the
shareholders' interests.
Part I of this essay explains why the right-of-action question in Young is
again on the agenda-namely, because the meaning of Young as a
precedent figures in the current controversy over whether plaintiffs
advancing preemption claims enjoy authority to sue, grounded in the
Supremacy Clause, in the absence of explicit authorizing legislation. One
may be sympathetic to the view that the supremacy principle alone warrants
at least some private preemption suits, but nonetheless maintain that Young
is not the best citation for advocates of that idea. Of course, one can
investigate plaintiffs' authority to sue without questioning Young's iconic
significance regarding sovereign immunity. Immunity is another matter
and need be treated only insofar as it bears on the right-of-action question.
Part II offers an historical study of Young itself, centered on the formal
structure of the original suit as a shareholder action. The Young case must
be understood within a tradition in which corporations systematically
employed shareholder suits to press constitutional claims. It is a familiar
irony that in our time Young is revered as an essential ingredient of
arrangements by which personal civil rights and civil liberties may be
vindicated, but that, in its own day, Young was an instrument used by
industry to forestall regulation that threatened corporate profits.
Part III notes (with alarm) that some of the justices have recently cited
John Harrison's revisionist account of Young with apparent approval.'
Harrison is open to critiques on several fronts. Moreover, if his view is
accepted, Young might end up as a precedent favoring corporations
attempting to frustrate social welfare legislation in progressive states. It
would be irony upon irony if, in this way, the Court were even partially to
resurrect a world in which Young is principally a tool of business rather
than a feature of public interest litigation.
I
For specialists, a reexamination of Young needs no justification. The
topic has intrinsic interest apart from any practical import. For the rest of
humankind, some explanation is necessary. There is one. This old case is
John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2008).
8 The academic literature is filled with treatments of Ex parte Young. Recent work
includes Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex Parte Young: Once Controversial, Now Canon, in
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 247 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010); David
Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses offHistory, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 69 (2011).
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a principal citation in current accounts of the conditions for private actions
pursuing judicial remedies for violations of federal law.
The right-of-action question was not always with us. The common law
was largely a body of individual rights and correlative duties.9 The only
law to be enforced was one person's duty to respect another's rights, and
the only institutions available to enforce that law were courts. A legal
argument was intelligible only if it could be advanced by means of a private
suit; there was no right without a remedy-meaning a judicial remedy.' 0
Today, of course, the landscape of American law and institutions is quite
different. Much federal law does not sound in individual rights and duties,
but rather entails programmatic regulation for the good of the public at
large. Regulatory law does not necessarily require judicial remedies in
every instance. There are many alternative implementation mechanisms,
chief among them agency enforcement. Accordingly, the authorization (or
not) of private litigation presents an independent question the Court, in its
wisdom, insists is usually for Congress to address.
There is an optimistic way to look at this. Perhaps Congress should
decide whether to authorize private suits. In some instances, it may make
sense to employ private actions as the primary means of enforcement. In
other contexts, it may be better to relegate private suits to a supplemental
role, operating in the shadow of public mechanisms. In still other
circumstances, it may be wise to exclude private actions from the field, lest
they interfere with administrative schemes and the exercise of discretion by
responsible officials. Getting the mix of enforcement instruments right
requires judgment, which perhaps should rest with politically accountable
public servants. There is a literature that ought to be consulted before we
assume that private suits are always and everywhere a good thing."
There is also a less sunny, not to say more cynical, attitude to strike. The
authorization (or not) of private litigation may be an element in the package
of compromises necessary to reach agreement on the enactment of a
regulatory program. Bluntly stated, the companies due to be regulated and
their sympathetic champions may be unable to short-circuit a new law
entirely or to restrict its substantive reach as they would like. But they may
be able to obtain concessions at the level of enforcement. They may starve
9 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31-32 (1913).
10 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1768).
" See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1982) (the classic general discussion); see also Trevor W. Morrison,
Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REv. 589 (2005)
(examining the pros and cons of private enforcement suits).
54
2013 / YOUNG AGAIN
federal agencies of the funds and personnel needed to ensure compliance or,
to the same end, they may withhold authority from private organizations
that might otherwise take up the slack. One can say, of course, that this
scenario is perfectly legitimate-simply politics as usual when, in a
democracy, policy must emerge from the clash of competing interests.
Still, most of us would acknowledge a difference between missing out
private actions in an effort to achieve the best blend of enforcement
mechanisms and denying them for the purpose of crippling effective
implementation.
The Supreme Court plays a role in all this, and that role is scarcely
neutral. For some years now, the Court has focused extensive attention on
the question whether litigants who want to vindicate federal law are entitled
to bring private enforcement actions. 12 Ostensibly to ensure that anyone
who gets to sue does so with actual congressional blessing, the Court has
held that Congress must express the purpose to authorize private suits
explicitly.13  Yet to demand that Congress act affirmatively to permit
private litigation obviously makes it more difficult for Congress to act
favorably. In form, the Court is solicitous of Congress' decision-making
authority. In effect, the Court stacks the deck against the authorization of
private actions-and thus (perhaps) against effective enforcement of the
regulatory schemes affected. 14
The Court has curbed private rights of action in three ways. First, as just
explained, in cases culminating in Alexander v. Sandoval," the Court has
held that plaintiffs can pursue judicial remedies for violations of federal
statutes only if Congress expressly provides for private suits. Second, in
Gonzaga University v. Doe,16 the Court construed the right of action
established by the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to serve only for
violations of federal statutes that explicitly establish personal rights. Third,
in a related line of cases beginning with Bivens," the Court has decided that
private suits alleging violations of rights-bearing provisions of the
12 See H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied
Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501 (1986).
13 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
14 Justice Scalia is characteristically blunt about his disdain for private enforcement
suits. E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (charging that private litigants press
"phony" claims to obtain self-serving settlements).
1s 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
16 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
17 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
55
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 35:51
Constitution are foreclosed if Congress has supplied would-be plaintiffs
with an alternative vehicle." The working rationale of these last cases is
that rights of action are not implied by constitutional provisions, but are
fashioned by courts as a matter of policy. 9  What courts create as
nonconstitutional remedial devices Congress can adjust or eliminate by
statute.2
It is uncommon, but scarcely unheard of, that two streams of precedent
go along in parallel without attention to the tension between them. This has
happened in right-of-action cases. Even as the Court has restricted private
enforcement actions in these three ways, the Court has allowed many
private litigants to sue without benefit of federal authorizing legislation-if
the argument is that federal law preempts conflicting state arrangements.
The most common illustration cited is Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.21 In
preemption cases, the Supremacy Clause alone is said to warrant private
litigation.22
The time is coming when these two bodies of authority will be
reconciled. And when they are, Young will be in the thick of things. More
precisely, Young will be cited, and the question is what Young will
(properly) be cited for. The whole notion that private litigants with
18 E.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that plaintiffs were limited to
administrative avenues for the vindication of First Amendment claims). See also Minneci v.
Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617 (2012) (holding that an alternative supplied by state tort law may also
answer).
19 The weight of authority has converged on this understanding, offered by Justice
Harlan concurring in Bivens. The right of action in Bivens itself, and in all the other Bivens-
like cases since, is a matter of federal, nonconstitutional, judge-made law. This certainly
goes for damages actions, and it probably goes for equitable suits as well. Cf Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Bivens as a federal common law decision).
20 It is an open question whether Congress might abolish all private suits even when
only forward-looking injunctive or declaratory relief is sought and there is no alternative.
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14 (expressly bypassing the issue). Yet it is probably a
safe bet that courts cannot be cut out of the picture entirely when constitutional rights are at
stake.
21 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (permitting an airline to claim that state labor regulations were
preempted by a federal statute).
22 See David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REv.
355, 391 (2004) (contending that the Court "tacitly assumed" as much in Shaw); Marsha S.
Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional Adjudication in Federal
Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 708-09 (2009) (also reading Shaw this way). In cases in
which plaintiffs seek only forward-looking relief, it is common to add that the federal courts
have traditionally granted equitable remedies to ensure the supremacy of federal law. E.g.,
Brief for Dominguez Respondents (Medicaid recipients) at 41, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-1158).
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standing may not be entitled to seek judicial relief has emerged
comparatively recently as a feature of the modem administrative state,
which offers a menu of enforcement mechanisms from which to choose. It
is artificial to search through old cases for what courts and lawyers at best
assumed and, indeed, would have discounted as immaterial if it had come to
their conscious minds at all. In the current debate over rights of action, the
historical Young case cannot be cited for much.
We can set some issues aside. The Young case has nothing to do with
decisions like Sandoval. Nobody was trying to enforce a federal statute in
Young; all the claims advanced were constitutional. Nor does Young have
much relevance to the Gonzaga interpretation of § 1983. Again, the
plaintiffs in Young pressed only constitutional claims of right.2 3
If the fact pattern in Young were to repeat itself today, a suit by the
railroads would probably come under the heading of § 1983.24 A
corporation may employ a § 1983 suit to obtain equitable relief against an
officer with responsibility for administering a state statute said to deprive
the corporation of property without due process of law.25 When Young was
decided, however, the Supreme Court denied that property interests
protected by due process were "secured" by the Constitution within the
meaning of § 1983.26 Accordingly, § 1983 did not establish the authority to
sue in Young.
The Young case may bear on the availability of private actions advancing
constitutional claims. Many observers have long understood Justice
Peckham to have recognized (implicitly) that the Fourteenth Amendment
supplied the plaintiffs' right of action.2 7  The idea that rights-bearing
provisions of the Constitution come with their own, built-in remedial
authority has much to recommend it.2 8 Even the most vehement opponents
23 It is scarcely obvious that corporations have "rights" under the "dormant" Commerce
Clause. But they do. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
24 And in the next breath it would probably be foreclosed by the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1342, which now typically bars federal injunctions against state utility rates.
25 E.g., Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001) (ultimately rejecting a
due process claim on the merits).
26 Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the
Scope ofSection 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1502-04 (1989).
27 The conventional citation for this view is Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 524 & n. 124 (1954) (contending that Young
was a "crucial advance" in the evolution of the idea that federal law provided for injunctive
relief whether or not a defendant's behavior constituted a breach of some state law duty).
Accord Berzon, supra note 22, at 690-91.
28 Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 289 (1995).
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of Bivens object primarily to actions for damages as opposed to suits
seeking only forward-looking equitable relief.29 Then again, if "implied"
rights of action in constitutional cases have now been reconceptualized as
matters of nonconstitutional remedial law (and they have), then Young may
be shoe-homed into current analysis. It would not be crazy to say that,
when Young was decided, there was no alternative enforcement mechanism
and that is why the plaintiffs' suit could go forward.o
The Young case plainly has a role in the explanation for the line of cases
in which preemption claims have been heard without explicit statutory
authorization." It is arguable that Young proceeded from the premise that a
claim that state rail rates conflicted with the Federal Constitution could be
advanced under the authority of the Supremacy Clause. This idea is more
dynamic. If a Supremacy Clause right of action worked in Young for the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, it would seem that it
should work for any aspect of the Constitution said to trump state law. And
if it worked for constitutional provisions, it would seem that it should work
for federal statutes as well.32 Congress may sensibly be assigned more
authority regarding the enforcement of federal law that Congress itself
created.33 Yet the supremacy rationale still fits. 3 4
This was the way Young came up in Douglas this past Term. Medicaid
recipients and providers in California sued state authorities, contending that
recently enacted state statutes limiting reimbursements were preempted by
provisions of the federal Medicaid Act.3 ' No federal statute expressly
provided for private enforcement actions by those plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
nonetheless cited, and the lower court relied upon, numerous prior cases,
including Young, in which the Supremacy Clause had apparently been
enough by itself.36
29 E.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing Exparte Young on this ground).
3o See Bandes, supra note 28, at 332-33.
31 See id. at 334-36.
32 Sloss, supra note 22, at 379 (contending that "statutory" preemption cases build on
Young).
33 Berzon, supra note 22, at 701 (contending that Congress may be entitled to deference
regarding the implementation of statutes but not with respect to the enforcement of
constitutional mandates).
34 This essay does not address the substance of the Court's preemption analysis, but is
exclusively concerned with how cases presenting preemption issues get into court to be
analyzed.
3 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012).
36 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 2008),
vacated, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012).
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The full Court got out of the Douglas case without engaging the right-of-
action problem. In the eleventh hour, federal authorities concluded that the
California statutes were consistent with federal law, and the Court
remanded the case for further consideration in light of changed
circumstances. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer explained that the
new federal administrative ruling introduced the real possibility that the
plaintiffs would be able to raise their arguments in an action authorized by
the Administrative Procedure Act.38
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts objected to the idea that the Supremacy
Clause warrants private preemption actions and, in particular, to the notion
that Justice Peckham recognized as much in Young a hundred years ago.39
Private suits contending that federal statutes preempt state law are not
easily distinguishable from actions claiming that state law or the conduct of
state officers violates federal enactments-that is, private suits that are now
supposed to depend on positive authorization by Congress.40 Roberts went
straight to the tension between the Court's parallel lines of authority and
picked a side. To adopt the view that the Supremacy Clause alone permits
private litigation, he declared, would invite litigants claiming violations of
federal statutes to skirt the Court's decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga by
characterizing their arguments as preemption claims.4 ' Accordingly, he
insisted, the plaintiffs in Douglas could not proceed in the absence of a
statute establishing a right of action for the purpose.42
The routine availability of preemption suits remains uncertain and, with
it, the best understanding of Young on the right-of-action issue. The idea
that the supremacy principle suffices in at least some preemption cases is
attractive; it would be hard to argue that so many precedents that appear to
depend on this very premise were wrongly decided. Nor would it be
persuasive to say that the source of the plaintiffs' right of action in the
preemption precedents was overlooked, bracketed for purposes of deciding
cases on other grounds, or forfeited by defendants who failed to object-the
existence of a right of action being nonjurisdictional.43 Moreover, one may
" Douglas, 132 S.Ct. at 1211.
3 Id. at 1210.
39 Id. at 1213 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.).
40 See Sloss, supra note 22, at 370-72 (contending that the difference is largely
semantic).
' Douglas, 132 S.Ct. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1215.
4 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that the
absence of a valid right of action does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction). But see
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1448-49 (2011) (explaining away
59
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 35:51
fairly regret the jurisprudence Chief Justice Roberts would defend-
namely, the Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions making it difficult for private
litigants to enforce federal statutes.
This said, Young is not a good citation for the proposition that private
preemption suits are authorized by the supremacy principle. It may be that
Young has since been absorbed into a tradition of federal constitutional
rights of action in preemption cases.7 But if we look backward only, we
find that the litigation in Young was a product of its times and has no
genuine purchase as a precedent on the right-of-action problem as it is
viewed today. Let's examine the historical Young now and return to current
issues in Part III.
II
The full story behind Young is not so well known as the hornbook
version. But it is no less well documented. Richard Cortner explains that
the roots of Young run to the years following the Civil War when farmers in
the upper Midwest bridled at the excessive rates railroads charged for
transporting their produce to market. 45 Early on, critics of high rail rates
urged Congress to bring the railroads to heel by exercising its power to
regulate interstate commerce.4 6 The railroads resisted, of course, but soon
realized that they could best protect their interests by engineering federal
legislation with limited reach and effects.47 The statute Congress adopted,
the Act to Regulate Commerce, constructed a regulatory scheme that was
largely favorable to the railroad corporations meant to be restrained.48 The
Act was deficient in numerous respects.4 9 State legislatures filled the void
Establishment Clause precedents on the ground that the plaintiffs' standing had not been
raised and considered).
4 See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 83 (suggesting that Young may have been "part of [the]
process" leading incrementally to the recognition of a federal right of action in constitutional
cases).
45 RICHARD C. CoRTNER, THE IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RAILROADS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, at 3 (1993).
46 Id. at 23.
47 GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, at 232-33 (1965)
(presenting the Act as essentially a case of regulatory capture).
48 The Act's effectiveness was also diminished by unsympathetic judicial decisions. See
ISAIAH LEO SHARFMAN, I THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 23-24 (1931).
49 The intricacies are not pertinent to this story. But one illustration is that, in its initial
form, the Act did not give the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to fix rail rates.
See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.RY. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 493
(1897) (so holding). That shortcoming was not corrected until the Hepburn Amendment in
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by enacting Granger laws, which in various forms set maximum limits on
the rates exacted for intrastate shipments.50 In response, railroads launched
a sustained, multi-track campaign to defeat rate regulation at the state level
on constitutional grounds."
In 1876, the Supreme Court held in the Granger Cases that states could
fix maximum rates for common carriers and similar businesses and that
courts would not second-guess state decisions.52 The principal case, Munn
v. Illinois,5 3 dealt with rates for grain elevators. But the Court made it clear
in companion cases that the Munn analysis applied to rail rates as well.5 4
Chief Justice Waite flatly rejected arguments that state rate-fixing violated
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or both. If railroads
thought they needed to charge more, they must take their plight to "the
polls, not to the courts."
The Granger Cases confirmed state authority to regulate rates, but at the
same time galvanized the railroads' resolve to continue the fight. They
promptly developed additional test cases that, step by step, brought the
Court around to their way of thinking. In the Milk Rate and Switching
Cases in 1890, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred states
from establishing rates that deprived railroads of a reasonable return on
their investment and that courts would ensure that state rates met the
constitutional standard.56 The most famous decision in the period, Smyth v.
1906. See SHARFMAN, supra note 48, at 28 (describing the Commission's early inability to
establish rates as a "crucial defect"); Clyde B. Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate
Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 289, 326-27 (1937) (describing the
Hepburn Act). Federal railroad regulation was obviously a much more complicated affair,
which took shape over time. Sharfman and Aitchison offer detailed accounts. See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988).
so The Supreme Court held that only Congress could regulate interstate rates. Wabash,
St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
51 See Aitchison, supra note 49, at 292; Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1023.
52 See Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley,
5 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1953) (the classic study).
1 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
54 Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876); Peik v.
Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 94 US. 164 (1876); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v.
Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1876); Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1876);
Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1876).
" Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
56 Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890)
[hereinafter the Milk Rate Case]; Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 467 (1890)
[hereinafter the Switching Case].
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Ames, 7 was among those marking the start of the notorious "Lochner Era,"
when the Court used substantive due process to invalidate numerous state
statutes regulating economic activity.
Just as the Granger Cases had failed to discourage the railroads from
resisting rate regulation, decisions like Smyth v. Ames failed to stanch state
attempts to curb railroad price gouging. Cortner contends that Theodore
Roosevelt's battles with big business fostered further state attempts to rein
in rail rates. 59 In the event, state legislatures adopted a host of new rate
measures, which, in turn, triggered more litigation.6 0  Not satisfied with
their success in due process cases like Smyth, the railroads renewed the
argument that state rate-fixing invaded Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce.6' At least some railroads consciously thought matters
through and concluded that they preferred to be subjected to federal
superintendence rather than endure more demanding regulation at the hands
of the states.62 So declared Robert Mather, President of the Rock Island
Line: "The regulation that threatens peril to the railroads . . . is the
regulation of the states. ... The day is past for unyielding opposition to all
policies of federal control of our carrier corporations. Nay, more, the day
has dawned in which to welcome that control."
For our purposes, the crucial question is the means by which litigation
over state rate regulation proceeded. The most important cases to date had
reached the Supreme Court on direct review of state court judgments. In
Munn v. Illinois, warehouse operators had appealed from a misdemeanor
conviction in state court." In one of the other Granger Cases, a shipper
" 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
58 See William F. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte
Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 BYU L. REV. 539 (one of many articles making
the connection between Ex parte Young and Lochner). Of course, recent scholarship has
clarified that the Court was less business-oriented than once was popularly thought. But it is
noncontroversial that the Court employed substantive due process as it would not be used
today-mostly in service of protecting corporations from regulation. The "Lochner Era"
label remains common. E.g., Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons
from the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984);
Friedman, supra note 8, at 248.
s9 CORTNER, supra note 45, at 132-37.
60 Id. at 135-36.
6 Id. at 158.
62 id.
63 Robert Mather, The Railroad Problem, XLIII THE RAILROAD GAZETTE, No. 16, at 454
(Oct. 18, 1907), cited in CORTNER, supra note 45, at 158.
6 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 119 (1876) (noting that a fine of $100 had been
imposed).
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had filed an original state court civil suit against a railroad. In the Milk
Rate and Switching Cases, railroads had raised their constitutional
objections in defense of state court civil enforcement actions.66 From the
railroads' point of view, the more efficient and propitious vehicles were
affirmative suits invoking the federal courts' equity jurisdiction to hear
constitutional challenges to state-established rates. In some instances,
railroads themselves initiated suit in federal court. 8 In the main, however,
railroads pursued their ends in federal actions brought against them by their
own shareholders. This was the pattern in Smyth v. Ames and other cases
prior to Young.69
The explanation for the railroads' reliance on shareholder suits is almost
certainly to be found in the wider experience of corporate litigators in the
period. Let's be candid. It was not that investors were genuinely
antagonistic to the companies in which they held stock and sued for relief
that corporations actually resisted. Shareholders were shills. They were
formal alternative plaintiffs whose suits could evade obstacles in the way of
actions by corporations themselves. Illustrations abound. Early on, before
Congress conferred federal question jurisdiction on federal courts in 1875,
corporations manufactured federal diversity jurisdiction by recruiting out-
of-state shareholders as plaintiffs. 70 They also used shareholder suits to get
around equitable and statutory prohibitions on injunctions against the
collection of taxes.7 1 Corporations were limited to suits for reimbursement,
but shareholders could sue up front to keep corporations from paying taxes
in the first place.72 Corporations equally employed shareholder suits to
achieve standing to litigate in federal court. Prior to 1940, companies could
65 E.g., Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1876); see Blake v. Winona
& St. Peter R.R. Co., 19 Minn. 418 (1872).
66 E.g., Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890);
Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 467 (1890).
67 See CORTNER, supra note 45, at 129.
68 E.g., Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876); see
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Attorney General, 5 F. Cas. 594 (D.Iowa 1875).
69 See also Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); cf Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (an original suit by a bank as the holder of a trust deed issued by a
railroad to secure bonds).
'0 The famous illustration is Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). See
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881) (acknowledging the tactic); Ann
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE
L.J. 77, 89-92, 95-99 (1997) (describing the widespread practice of litigating federal
questions in diversity and contending that the Supreme Court was content with it).
71 Brushaber v. Union Pac. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1916).
72 E.g., id. at 10.
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not sue on the basis of economic injury alone, but shareholders could secure
standing on the strength of their legal relations with their corporations.
Against this background, it is easy enough to reconstruct the railroads'
reasons for using a shareholder suit in Minnesota where the litigation
leading to Young began. As Cortner tells the story, Attorney General
Young hatched a two-part scheme to keep the railroads from mounting a
legal challenge to newly prescribed rates.74 The first part of the plan was to
prevent the railroads from attacking the rates in defense of a state
enforcement action. On this front, Young drafted rate regulations
enforceable by criminal prosecution, steep fines, and, in some instances,
incarceration. With these threats in view, the railroads would hesitate to
violate the new rates as a means of obtaining an opportunity to test their
validity in state court. Indeed, they would be unable to find employees
willing to bell the cat. The second part of the plan depended on the
Supreme Court's decision in Fitts v. McGhee,75 where the Court had
rejected a federal civil suit for an injunction preventing the enforcement of
a state statute-arguably on the ground that the state officers named as
defendants were not personally charged with enforcement responsibility.7 6
Expecting to have the benefit of Fitts, Young drafted the new rate
arrangements in Minnesota without specifying any particular officer to
initiate enforcement proceedings.77
If both parts of this scheme worked, Young hoped the railroads would
have no viable means of complaining to the courts, state or federal, and
would have to live with the new rates whatever they thought of them.
Cortner reports that the railroads felt the pinch and, for a time, appeared to
acquiesce.78 They dutifully published some of the rates at stationhouses
and adhered to them even to the day of the Supreme Court's decision.79 Yet
they also prepared for litigation in the form of a shareholder action in a
federal circuit court, claiming that the rates fixed by the Minnesota Railroad
73 E.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1920). See Larry Yackle,
Federal Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the Progressive Era: A Case Study of Smith v.
K.C. Title & Trust Co. (forthcoming) (on file with the author) (explaining this aspect of
Smith).
74 CORTNER, supra note 45, at 144-45.
" 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
76 Young overread Fitts, or so Justice Peckham later had it in his opinion in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156-57 (1908). See also Friedman, supra note 8, at 259 (noting that
Fitts might have rested on an abstention ground).
n CORTNER, supra note 45, at 145-46.
78 Id. at 146.
7 Young, 209 U.S. at 126 (noting as much).
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and Warehouse Commission, as well as the rates and regulations mandated
directly by two statutes, were unconstitutional.80
Shareholders could get the validity of the rates before a federal court by
suing their own railroad corporations for injunctions barring the railroads
from limiting their charges to what the state prescribed. There was no need,
then, for employees to violate a rate schedule and suffer prosecution. Nor
was there any need for the railroads themselves to sue the members of the
Commission or Attorney General Young and take the chance that Fitts
would pose a bar. The railroads would win everything they desired by
losing a suit brought by shareholders claiming that the railroads must do
what they wanted to do anyway.
It cannot be proven that things fit together this neatly. Cortner reports
that certain major shareholders, especially John S. Kennedy in New York,
pressed for litigation when some of the railroads were not convinced it was
wise. 8 1 There is evidence indicating that railroad officers and lawyers in
Minnesota who did want to take the rates to court were doubtful about the
shareholder device, because they hesitated to involve other attorneys
(formally representing shareholders) who might have their own ideas about
the issues.82 Yet it is implausible that shareholders genuinely forced the
railroads into court to defend a voluntary choice to adopt the rates. The
shareholders alleged that they had asked the directors to disobey state law
and file their own action to prevent the rates from becoming effective and
that the directors had refused.83 But those allegations were protocol in any
shareholder suit, ostensibly meant to discourage collusion. In truth, the
railroads plainly supported litigation. They paid the costs of the
shareholder action, their lawyers worked with counsel for the shareholders
to hone the legal arguments, and, when it came time to name an attorney to
so This is accurate but incomplete. The railroads initially filed a federal action
challenging certain commodity rates set by the Commission and entered half-hearted
negotiations with state authorities for a settlement. CORTNER, supra note 45, at 139-44. It
was after those talks collapsed (because the railroads were unwilling to compromise much at
all) that Attorney General Young developed new rate regulations for the Minnesota
Legislature to adopt, coupled with his plan to deny the railroads a viable means of
challenging the new rates in court. Id. at 144-46. There were actually nine separate (but
coordinated) suits by shareholders in each of the railroad corporations operating in
Minnesota, albeit the Supreme Court ultimately examined only one of them. Young, 209
U.S. at 129. For the sake of simplicity, this essay adopts the conventional practice of
referring to the original shareholder actions in the singular.
81 CORTNER, supra note 45, at 155.
82 Id. at 154-58.
83 E.g., Bill of Complaint in Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 155 F. 445 (C.C.D.Minn.
1907), Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Exhibit A, at 14.
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make the oral argument in the Supreme Court, it was J.J. Hill, the larger-
than-life President of the Great Northern Railroad, who made the choice
(over Kennedy's express objection).84
You will say that if the railroads were the plaintiffs in fact, it should
make no difference to us now that they were defendants in law. If,
however, we are trying to identify the right of action in Young as it was
understood at the time, the alignment of the parties matters a great deal.
Again, an accurate account of this old case in its day is primarily of
historical interest and should not bear significantly on the current policy
questions facing the country. But if the Supreme Court thinks that the
historical suit in Young has precedential value, then we need to get the
historical case right. And the right way to understand Young historically is
as a shareholder suit against the railroads. No one denies this, but there is a
tendency to acknowledge the point as a formality and move on. That is a
mistake.
It remains to characterize the source of the shareholders' right of action
in Young. On this crucial point, we cannot expect much help from the
Court's opinion. Bear in mind again that, in 1908, the idea of separating
out plaintiffs' authority to go to court in search of (some) judicial remedy
was largely alien, given the common law model that prevailed at the time.
One looks in vain for an explicit discussion of plaintiffs' ability to seek a
judicial remedy in any of the Supreme Court's contemporaneous opinions.
Still, if cases like Young are to be assigned significance as precedent
regarding the right-of-action question today, we have to impose this modern
idea retrospectively.
One answer is that the right of action in Young was created by state law.
In another classic case in the period, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co.,86 a shareholder sued his own corporation for an injunction preventing
the company from purchasing tax-exempt bonds issued by federal land
banks that Congress allegedly had no constitutional power to create. The
Court now regards the right of action in Smith to have been grounded in the
state corporate law of Missouri.87 If this is an accurate understanding of
Smith, the same explanation may serve for Young. The shareholder-
plaintiffs in Young may have been authorized to bring the suit they did by
the law of Minnesota, which presumably recognized that shareholders could
sue so long as the classic elements of a shareholder action were in place-
8 CORTNER, supra note 45, at 162, 186.
85 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice
Holmes, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 2151, 2177 (2009).
86 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
87 Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
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like the standard allegations that the plaintiffs had demanded that the
directors do something and that the directors had refused to cooperate.
This answer is plausible, but dissatisfying. It is not just that Justice
Peckham did not purport to rely on local law at all, far less on Minnesota
state court decisions on the availability, features, and conditions of
shareholder suits.8 8 Again, we would hardly expect him to do that even if
he did think that state law supplied the plaintiffs' authority to sue. The
problem is that when Young was decided federal courts disclaimed any
particular state's decisional law and applied general common law and
uniform equity principles that Erie and Guaranty Trust would not repudiate
for another thirty years.89 The better answer, then, is that the shareholder
suit in Young went forward under the rubric of general law and equity.90
In shareholder cases like Young and Smith, the Supreme Court did attend
expressly to whether the plaintiffs satisfied the criteria for invoking federal
jurisdiction on the equity side. Shareholder suits were themselves creatures
of equity, having been originally developed by Chancery to deal with cases
in which the law courts declined to settle intracorporate disputes. 91 In
Young, Smith, and other shareholder cases, the Court equally examined the
plaintiffs' demonstration of the usual preconditions for equity jurisdiction-
irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law. It was here that Attorney
General Young's plan backfired. He convinced the circuit court that the
railroads could not be expected to attack the constitutionality of the new
rates by way of a defense to prosecution in state court, so the federal court
concluded that there was no adequate remedy at law for the claims the
shareholders wanted to raise.92 This attention to general principles of
equity again suggests that the authority to sue in Young (if we must identify
one) is best situated under the umbrella of general law and equity
principles.93
88 Cf David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty
Violations, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1174-75 (2000) (dismissing the possibility that Young
anticipated Smith because Justice Peckham did not identify a right of action based on state
law).
89 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Kristin A. Collins, "A Considerable Surgical Operation," Article
III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010)
(demonstrating that in the Nineteenth Century federal courts employed equitable remedies of
their own creation irrespective of the forms of relief available in the forum state's courts).
90 Accord Shapiro, supra note 8, at 82-83 (suggesting this understanding).
91 See Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders'Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 (1957).
92 Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 155 F. 445, 448-49 (C.C.D.Minn. 1907).
9 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 85, at 2177-78 (offering this conclusion regarding
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This is not to suggest that the right of action in Young was created by
federal law, after all. The "federal general common law" 9 4 discarded in
Erie was federal only in the sense that it was applied in the federal courts.95
We might now decide that the supremacy principle supplies a right of
action for plaintiffs pressing preemption claims; it would not be necessary
to overrule Young to reach that conclusion. But Young did not establish
such a proposition in 1908, such that we might now cite Young as a
precedent we should follow in the stare decisis sense that like cases usually
ought to be decided alike.
III
In his dissent in Douglas, Chief Justice Roberts suggested a quite
different means of getting rid of Young as a precedent for preemption suits
on the basis of the Supremacy Clause. Roberts quoted a passage from
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the VOPA case a year earlier:
Young, Kennedy said, involved "the pre-emptive assertion in equity of a
defense that would otherwise have been available in the State's
enforcement proceedings at law." 97 This description of Young takes some
unpacking.
The issue in VOPA was not whether private litigants had a right of action
to enforce federal law. The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy
was organized under a federal spending program to investigate allegations
of patient mistreatment at state mental hospitals. There was no doubt that
VOPA had statutory authority to bring an action to obtain records that
might throw light on its inquiry. The question was whether VOPA, itself an
arm of the state, could evade the state's sovereign immunity in a suit
against the state officers in possession of the records. Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia declared that VOPA's public status made no
difference. He explained that the immunity doctrine ascribed to Young has
Smith).
94 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
9 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1521-24 (1984)
(explaining that general law was not understood to be part of the supreme federal law);
Collins, supra note 89, at 290 (same).
96 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204, 1211-15 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
9 Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1642 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 1638 (majority opinion).
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been accepted for a century "as necessary to 'permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights."' 9 9  The "premise-less delicately called a
'fiction"'-is that "when a federal court commands a state official to do
nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for
sovereign-immunity purposes."' 00 To determine whether Young avoids
state sovereign immunity, "a court need only conduct a 'straightforward
inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. "'01
Justice Kennedy's reason for writing separately was plain enough. While
he agreed that VOPA could "rely on Young"l 02 to dodge state immunity in
the circumstances of this case, he declined to endorse Justice Scalia's
description of Young in general.10 3  Previously, in the Coeur d'Alene
case,104 Kennedy had floated the novel idea that Young is not the routinely
available device for finessing state immunity it is conventionally thought to
be and that an officer's ability to assert the state's immunity depends on a
"careful balancing and accommodation of state interests" implicated in the
particular case.'s In VOPA, then, Justice Kennedy used his concurring
opinion to conduct an ad hoc examination of the state's interests,
concluding that the threat to the state's dignity was insufficient to defeat the
suit under his own understanding of Young.10 6 It was in that discussion,
focused on sovereign immunity, that Kennedy offered the account of Young
that Chief Justice Roberts quoted in Douglas-an account that restricts
Young to a case in which litigants invoked federal equity jurisdiction to
advance claims that would have been defenses to an enforcement action
brought by state officials in state court.
Justice Kennedy did not develop this limited understanding of Young on
his own. He adopted it from John Harrison, who had recently argued that
Young is best understood as having allowed the railroads to seek a federal
anti-suit injunction that would forestall threatened state enforcement
proceedings.107 Time was, justices of the Supreme Court hesitated to cite a
9 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)).
100 Id
101 Id. at 1639 (quoting Verizon Md. v. Public Svc. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002),
quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
102 Id. at 1643 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 1642.
1" Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
'0 Id. at 278-80.
1o6 VOPA, 131 S.Ct. at 1643 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989 (2008). Justice Kennedy did
not join Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Douglas. He buried himself in Justice
69
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 35:51
law journal article, lest they be understood to embrace all the author's
contentions. In this context, Justice Kennedy was more daring, not to say
reckless. He had been looking for a way to check the current Court's
understanding of Young, and Harrison offered a rationale. Then again,
Harrison's thesis does not lead to any sort of case-by-case appraisal of state
interests. Far from it. Harrison would deny Young's effect on sovereign
immunity in all cases in which enforcement actions are not imminent.
The plot thickens. In Douglas, the question was the availability of a
private right of action. 08  By lifting Kennedy's language ostensibly
endorsing Harrison's explanation of sovereign immunity in Young, Roberts
appeared to buy into Harrison's view regarding the source of the plaintiffs'
authority to sue-which is that Young assumed only that the railroads could
pursue an anti-suit injunction. The implications are scarcely clear. But it is
possible that Roberts saw full well where Harrison's argument leads and
meant to lay the groundwork for disallowing preemption actions in general,
but making an exception for suits by plaintiffs who are threatened with state
enforcement actions. That result would largely privilege parties most likely
to be subject to state regulation: businesses hoping to persuade the federal
courts that state social welfare regulation has been displaced by federal
statute law.
Harrison reaches his position on the right of action in Young from and
through his take on the sovereign immunity question.109 As to immunity,
he contends that the modem Court has it all wrong.'io Justice Peckham did
not adopt the fiction that the suit against the Attorney General was not a suit
against the state. Whatever he said about immunity (and what he said was,
by all accounts, problematic), his result in Young can be explained on the
ground that federal equity permitted the railroads to be treated as though
they were defendants. The state's immunity would not have kept the
railroads from offering their constitutional arguments as defenses in a state
court mandamus action, and federal equity simply allowed them to present
those defenses early in a suit to block an enforcement proceeding. The suit
by the railroads against Minnesota was "in substance" an action by
Minnesota against the railroads."' So Minnesota's sovereign immunity
was not involved.l12
Breyer's majority opinion avoiding the right-of-action issue.
108 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204, 1207 (2012).
'" Harrison, supra note 107, at 996-1001.
"o Id. at 990.
... Id. at 996.
112 Harrison argues that it was sixty years before the Court cited Young as authority for
defusing immunity in the absence of a threatened enforcement suit against the plaintiff. Yet
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Next, Harrison contends that this assessment of the immunity issue is
buttressed by Peckham's conception of the action in Young as an attempt to
achieve the nullification of unconstitutional enactments.' 13  The railroads
proposed to establish that the state-prescribed rates were not law at all, and
that is why the state was not implicated. In this sense, too, the railroads
were essentially in a defensive posture. They did not ask for "affirmative
relief' that would have forced Attorney General Young to take some action
in his capacity as a state officer.1 14  They requested only a "negative"
injunction preventing him from doing something he had "no legal right to
do."' 15 They wanted only to be "let alone."' 1 6
Finally, Harrison argues that the same equity principles that defused the
state's immunity also provided the railroads with the authority to bring suit.
An anti-suit injunction was "not just an equitable remedy but an equitable
cause of action."1 7  Harrison does not propose that the right of action
grounded in federal equity was federal in the sense that it might have
established "arising under" jurisdiction. For want of a better answer, he,
too, puts it down to the general law applied in the federal courts prior to
Erie.118
Harrison's explanation of Young is unpersuasive on all three of these
levels. His primary argument is at war with the very idea of state sovereign
immunity, which hinges on the distinction between claims advanced
offensively and defensively. Of course, private parties are not disarmed of
their legal arguments whenever they litigate with a state. If the state is the
he offers no exhaustive examination of the precedents and, indeed, neglects well known
early cases that are perfectly consistent with the modem account of Young. In Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), the Court made it clear that a railroad would
be able to invoke a district court's jurisdiction in a suit against state officials for injunctive
relief-once the railroad did what was necessary to complete the state's legislative process.
And in Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926), the Court confirmed a
district court's jurisdiction in an action contending that a state daylight savings law
conflicted with the analog federal statute. The suit in Benton was dismissed not for want of
federal judicial power to entertain it, but on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had alleged
the irreparable injury necessary in an action for an injunction. Justice Holmes' opinion
referred only to jurisdiction, not to immunity. But he scarcely overlooked sovereign
immunity as an issue. Justice McReynolds dissented on the theory that the trial court lacked
"jurisdiction" because the suit was "against Massachusetts" and thus barred by sovereign
immunity under "Fitts v. McGhee ... as construed in Exparte Young." Id. at 529.
1" Harrison, supra note 107, at 1004-05.
114 Id. at 1006.
" Id. (quoting Young, 209 U.S. at 159).
"1 Id. at 1006.
1 Id. at 1014n.100.
"1 Id. at 1014.
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aggressor, a private litigant does not question the state's dignity by
defending himself. The point of immunity is that a state can refuse to
subject itself to suits initiated by private plaintiffs. A private suit against an
unconsenting state is an affront to the state's dignity, or so the theory of
sovereign immunity would have it."9 To be sure, when a plaintiff seeks an
anti-suit injunction, he or she is making an argument that would be a
defense in the action the plaintiff wants to head off. But it is puzzling how
the argument can remain a defense when it is asserted offensively. It is
more puzzling how, if the defendant in an action for an anti-suit injunction
is a state officer, the mere existence of the suit makes sovereign immunity
go away. If immunity does disappear, it has to be for some reason other
than the self-evident truth that immunity would not have been an issue in
some other action brought by the defendant-turned-plaintiff.12 0 Harrison's
explanation of immunity also relies on a fiction-namely, the fiction that
the moving parties in Young were defending against an action brought by
the state that, well, wasn't.
It is not enough to say that the reason plaintiffs could turn the tables in
this way was that they could demonstrate the familiar prerequisites of
equity. Those conditions identified plaintiffs who got to pursue an
injunction rather than make do with remedies at law-compensation in
actions against private adversaries or a defense to prosecution in the case of
public officials. There is no obvious reason why they should have done
double duty, also identifying plaintiffs who got to make believe they were
defendants for purposes of state sovereign immunity. The two ideas, suing
in equity and eluding state immunity, were not the same thing. It is a
mystery why plaintiffs who passed the applicable tests for doing the one
somehow, for that reason alone, managed to do the other. If anything,
plaintiffs who could sue in equity despite an imminent state enforcement
action were in an especially weak position regarding the state's dignitary
119 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina,
535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
120 If Minnesota's immunity was not implicated in Young because the action for an anti-
suit injunction was conceptualized as itself a version of an enforcement action, it is not
obvious why a state officer rather than the state itself was named as the defendant. Harrison
anticipates this objection and responds that the Court respected the "purely formal principle"
that a state could not be named as a defendant "on the record." Harrison, supra note 107, at
1001. But if that is the answer, it seems that sovereign immunity was involved, after all, and
did not dissipate on the simple theory that the state was the plaintiff "in substance." Id. at
996.
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interests. By hypothesis, they wanted to make the state play defense
without giving the state a chance to play offense. 2 1
The contention that state immunity was avoided in Young because of the
character of the suit as an action by the railroads for an anti-suit injunction
fails for another reason. There wasn't any action by the railroads. Again,
the suit in Young was a shareholder action against the railroads as well as
other defendants. It was that shareholder suit, also a matter of federal
general law and equity, which evaded the state's immunity. 122  The
shareholder-plaintiffs did not face the prospect of actions against them.
They sued their own corporations to prevent compliance with state laws
that made their businesses less profitable. The railroad-defendants were
threatened by enforcement suits, and the relief the shareholders requested
was, in part, an injunction preventing the Attorney General from bringing
enforcement proceedings to make the railroads reduce their rates. But that
was different and essentially redundant.
It would be hard to argue that the shareholder action in Young might just
as easily have named only the railroads as defendants and left everybody
else out it, Young among them. There is a way that is true. Once the
railroads were enjoined from adopting the new rates, state officials were
unable to force the railroads to violate a federal court order-just as Young
121 This is not to suggest that there were no good reasons for an affirmative federal suit in
Young. The Supreme Court concluded that the railroads did not have the usual option of
violating state law once in order to generate a state enforcement suit and thus an opportunity
to raise their federal claims in defense. Nor is it to suggest that state immunity should have
barred a preemptive action by the railroads in federal court. Today, of course, immunity
would not be an issue. But that is because of the conventional "fictional" understanding of
Young, that is, that plaintiffs who sue a state officer for prospective relief are not suing the
state. The point here is only that once Harrison jettisons the conventional view of Young, he
has to offer some other explanation for why the state's dignity was not implicated. And the
plaintiffs' showing of an inadequate remedy at law does not measure up. The modem Court,
indeed, perceives powerful state interests in play after state immunity is dispatched-
interests that can lead to federal abstention even if, as was true in Young, a federal suit is
initiated when no state enforcement action is under way. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975).
122 To be sure, there was something funny about this arrangement, too. Harrison, for his
part, calls it a fiction in the shareholder suit: "The fiction was that the railroads, as
represented by their shareholders, were the plaintiffs. They were actually defendants."
Harrison, supra note 107, at 1001. It is true that the railroads were allied with the
shareholder-plaintiffs and so were not your typical adversaries resisting the plaintiffs'
claims. But Harrison seems to have in mind Victor Victoria. The railroads in Young were
defendants pretending to be plaintiffs pretending to be defendants--defendants in form in
the suit brought by shareholders, plaintiffs in reality in light of their position and interests,
but then defendants for purposes of eluding state sovereign immunity.
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was (ultimately) unable to violate the injunction issued against him. 123
When lawyers once decide to sue anybody, they typically sue everybody
and let the named defendants wriggle out of the net if they can. In this
instance, the shareholders sued Young, the members of the Commission,
and even the heads of important shipping companies, seeking to enjoin
them all from attempting to enforce the rates fixed by state law. 124 Still, it
is too much to contend that bringing so many defendants into the room was
merely a belt-and-braces strategy by aggressive litigators. The pursuit of an
anti-suit injunction preventing third parties from trying to make the
railroads comply with state law surely was an important aspect of the case.
But the crucial point is that an anti-suit injunction was not the only point,
the raison d'etre that Harrison insists it was.
Nor is it persuasive to contend that the difference between prohibitory
and mandatory injunctions cut a significant figure in the historical Young
case. Today, of course, scarcely anyone would defend that old distinction
at all for any serious purpose.125 Even if we acknowledge that it was viable
123 A federal order directing the railroads not to adopt the rate schedules prescribed by
state law would not merely add to their defenses in a state enforcement action. If a state
action was imminent, the railroads would be able to get further orders from the federal court
"in aid of' its jurisdiction, under the authority granted by the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, would pose no bar inasmuch as the
federal court would act to "effectuate" its previous judgment.
124 Bill of Complaint, supra note 83, at 7-8.
125 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 264
(3rd ed. 2002) (expressing the conventional view that there has never been any basis for this
supposed distinction); cf California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 282-83 (1990)
(pronouncing the distinction "illusory" in the case at bar). Justice Scalia said in VOPA that
the immunity doctrine associated with Young is limited to situations in which a state officer
is ordered to "do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law." Virginia Office for
Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011). At a glance, one might take that
as an opening for limiting Young to "negative" injunction cases. Yet in context Scalia was
distinguishing other precedents in which a state was the "'real, substantial party in interest,"'
for example, when a federal judgment would "'expend itself on the public treasury or
domain, or interfere with public administration....'" Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.l 1 (1984), quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620
(1916)). The Ford Motor case was an action to recover tax revenues from the state's
treasury; Dugan v. Rank involved a suit against federal officials for an injunction forcing
them to release irrigation water in the Government's control. The famous illustration is In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), where a suit against another state attorney general was
conceived as an action for specific performance of a state's contract. Justice Scalia's ringing
reiteration of the Young immunity doctrine today clearly reaches affirmative relief or, better
said, ignores any supposed distinction, drawn historically, between negative and affirmative
injunctions. The injunction sought in VOPA itself was plainly of the latter ilk-namely, an
74
2013 / YOUNGAGAIN
in 1908, it offers Harrison no help. The historical suit that needs explaining
was, again, a shareholder action against the railroads and other defendants.
The temporary injunction the shareholders obtained "restrained and
enjoined" the railroads from "publishing, adopting, or putting into effect"
the rate schedules prescribed by the Commission and state statutes. 126
Despite the (traditional) use of the term "restrained," the injunction was
hardly negative at all. Indeed, it looks pretty affirmative--effectively
ordering the railroads to charge their customers more. For our purposes, all
that matters is that the injunction against the railroads did not prohibit
anybody from bringing an action to enforce the state-established rates. The
idea that the state's immunity was avoided by an action to restrain an
attempt to enforce a nullity is counterfactual. The shareholders were not
asking to be let alone.
Finally, Harrison's argument that the right of action in Young came from
general law and equity is right in general, but wrong in particular. For
reasons we have just gone through, we should conclude that the historical
Young is not precedent for the proposition that the Constitution itself
warrants private suits to preserve the supremacy of federal law. Yet
Harrison picks the wrong feature of federal equity on which to ride.
Equitable actions for anti-suit injunctions were recognized in 1908 (as they
are today). But that is not the kind of action that was at the bottom of
Young. Here again, Harrison neglects what should be crucial-namely, that
the suit actually brought was a shareholder action.
Formalities matter. If Young is understood in hindsight as exclusively a
case about the railroads' entitlement to sue for an anti-suit injunction, then
Young is not authority for the proposition that plaintiffs today can sue for
injunctions running to defendants who do not threaten the plaintiffs with
actions of their own. Such a limitation of Young would not merely rob the
argument for more generally available preemption suits of a prominent
precedent. It would make of Young a back-side citation for denying that
plaintiffs in general have a time-honored authority to seek judicial relief
with respect to preemption claims without congressional approval, but
injunction requiring recalcitrant state officers to hand over documents in their possession.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
126 Order in Perkins v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 155 F. 445 (C.C.D.Minn. 1907), Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Exhibit A, at 113-14. The injunction the shareholders
requested would have "enjoined and restrained" the railroads from "continuing to observe or
keep in force" the state rate schedules, or from "publishing or adopting" the state rates, or
from "reducing" rates to conform to the state schedules. Bill of Complaint, supra note 83, at
15.
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making an exception for plaintiffs who face the threat of suit by somebody
else.
The losers in this game would be plaintiffs like the Medicaid recipients in
Douglas, who faced no threat of enforcement actions.'27 Of course, not all
individual plaintiffs would be boxed out of federal court. Individuals, too,
sometimes sue for declaratory or injunctive relief from potential
prosecution.128 Moreover, in many civil rights and civil liberties cases, the
plaintiffs claim violations of personal rights and thus can rely on § 1983 for
their authority to sue. But § 1983 is not always available.12 9 An amicus
brief in Douglas cited numerous instances in which individual plaintiffs'
right of action arguably rested on the Supremacy Clause.130 Plaintiffs in
civil rights and civil liberties cases who are not threatened with
enforcement actions and cannot proceed via § 1983 would be turned away
at the door.
The winners would largely be businesses-plaintiffs far more likely to be
subject to state regulation and thus to face enforcement actions brought by
state officials in state court.13' In an attempt to persuade the Court that the
Supremacy Clause is routinely sufficient in the preemption context, the
respondents in Douglas listed sixty-one prior cases in which plaintiffs were
permitted to press preemption claims without benefit of any statute
127 The participants in Douglas fully appreciated this. Many of the briefs urging the
Court to disapprove the preemption suits by beneficiaries and providers expressly invoked
Harrison's argument. See Brief for Petitioners (California state officials) at 43-45, Douglas
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283)
(citing and relying on Harrison); Brief of National Governors Association, et al. at 24-25,
Douglas, 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958) (same); cf Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 19-21, Douglas, 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958) (acknowledging
Harrison's reading of Young but contending that the Court did not have to determine its
validity in the case at bar).
128 E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (involving a suit for a declaratory
judgment that a threatened prosecution would violate the First Amendment).
129 Judge Berzon cites one of the desegregation cases, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), where the defendants were school officials in the District of Columbia. It was many
years later that Congress amended § 1983 to reach action under color of law in the District.
Berzon, supra note 22, at 686.
130 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al., Douglas, 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012)
(No. 09-958).
131 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REv.
343, 371 (allowing for the possibility that the Court's preemption jurisprudence is being
written by justices who are "predisposed against government regulation"); Sloss, supra note
22, at 372 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs in most preemption cases are corporations but
largely rejecting favoritism as the rationale for allowing the suits in those cases to proceed
without statutory authorization).
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conferring a right of action.13 2 In forty-two of those cases, the plaintiffs
were for-profit corporations hoping to escape state regulation. Admittedly
not all, but decidedly most, of the statutes and rules corporations meant to
frustrate promoted public health and safety, fair labor relations, consumer
protection, and environmental quality. Small wonder the Chamber of
Commerce filed an amicus brief in Douglas, contending that preemption
claims require no authorizing legislation. 33
It is sobering that Chief Justice Roberts may have this future in mind for
us. Consider a familiar pattern. Let's state it starkly for clarity and
emphasis. Companies resist any interference with their businesses that may
diminish profits. They use political muscle in Congress to avert regulation
if they can, to dilute any regulation they cannot avoid, and to frustrate the
implementation of enacted federal measures. One means of limiting
enforcement is to deny the beneficiaries of regulation the ability to press
their own suits. Some states, wise to this pattern and disappointed by the
results, adopt their own regulatory schemes to make up the difference.
Companies then mount suits in federal court, using (modest, unevenly
enforced) federal regulation as a club against more effective local
programs.
This basic pattern was apparent in the railroads' conduct at the time of
Young. The railroads contrived to make federal regulation less rigorous
than it might have been. 13 4 Then they complained that more demanding
state regulation was preempted-albeit not by the federal statute, but by the
further power Congress had not yet exercised. Illustrations of a similar
pattern in our own time are not far to seek. 35
132 Brief for Dominguez Respondents, Douglas, 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958).
133 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Douglas, 132
S.Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958).
134 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
13 Financial institutions campaigned against the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and, since enactment, they have lobbied for implementing
regulations that will be difficult to enforce. Pat Garofalo, Wall Street Spending as Much To
Undermine Dodd-Frank Regulations as It Spent Trying to Block Dodd-Frank, THINK
PROGRESS (Apr. 22, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ politics/2011/04/22/160524
/banks-spending-201 1/?mobile=nc (describing the lobbying effort generally); Robert
Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, Bank Lobby's Onslaught Shifs Debate on Volcker Rule,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 25, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2012-03-26/bank-
lobby-s-onslaught-shifts-debate-on-volc (offering a particular illustration). The Act contains
provisions ostensibly meant to avoid preempting state arrangements in many instances. Yet
preemption arguments are already surfacing. E.g., Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 640
F.3d 1194 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 253 (2011) (sustaining a preemption claim on
the basis of industry-friendly regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency).
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The question, then, the real practical question, is whether the Supreme
Court will be complicit in these machinations. The Court has already
undermined federal social welfare legislation by insisting that private
enforcement suits must have express statutory authorization.'3 6 If the Court
disclaims preemption actions generally, but makes an exception for
plaintiffs pursuing anti-suit injunctions, the Court will foster federal
litigation meant to frustrate similar legislation at the state level.137
CONCLUSION
The source of the right of action in Young has importance today
inasmuch as Young is cited as a precedent in the modem debate over private
plaintiffs' ability to take preemption claims to court without express
authorization from Congress. A disciplined historical examination of
Young demonstrates, however, that Young has little to say about that
question. The original action in Young was a shareholder suit against
railroad corporations and other defendants. The shareholders' authority to
sue was a feature of general law and equity.
This historical account of Young does not foreclose a holding that the
supremacy principle now provides a right of action in preemption cases. It
does resist another position, suggested but not fully fleshed out by some of
the justices, that the right of action in Young was located in a different
aspect of federal equity-namely, the ability of the railroads to sue for an
anti-suit injunction. That account of Young is ahistorical and thinly
theorized. It is also bad policy. If accepted, it would suggest that business
interests should be able to sue without congressional authorization in hopes
of thwarting state social welfare legislation.
The question whether preemption suits require congressional
authorization is real, and it is hard. The Court may plausibly draw
136 See supra text accompanying note 13.
137 If the Court were to follow this course in reliance on Harrison's treatment of the right
of action in Young, a reassessment of Young's significance for sovereign immunity might not
be far behind. The Court now seems committed to the conventional understanding of Young
where immunity is concerned. Sovereign immunity is defused in any suits in which private
plaintiffs sue state officers for prospective relief regarding ongoing violations of federal law.
See supra text accompanying note 101. This familiar proposition does not restrict Young to
actions in which plaintiffs request an anti-suit injunction. The defendants in VOPA certainly
threatened no such action, yet they could not set up the state's immunity. But, according to
Harrison, the existence of a right of action in Young and the absence of a sovereign
immunity issue drew upon the same explanation-namely, that plaintiffs could maintain
their action in federal court because, and only because, they were in substance offering a
defense to an imminent enforcement proceeding.
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distinctions within the mass of preemption actions, permitting some suits
while disallowing others. 38 This essay has not contended for any particular
results or mix of results. The argument is only that the Court is not obliged,
by the precedent set in Young, to sort preemption cases in a way that further
skews the federal judicial system in favor of those who would confound
social welfare programs, both national and local.
13 Numerous distinctions might conceivably be drawn-e.g., cases in which the
Constitution is said to preempt state law versus cases in which the federal law at work is
nonconstitutional; cases in which only equitable or declaratory relief is sought versus cases
in which plaintiffs demand compensatory damages; cases in which plaintiffs contend that
federal law preempts state statutes versus cases in which only action by state executive
officers is implicated; cases in which plaintiffs raise preemption claims in suits against state
officers versus cases in which the defendants are other private parties; and cases in which the
federal law said to have preemptive effect is a condition on federal spending versus cases
involving other forms of federal regulation.
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